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Abstract: Focusing on Karl Jaspers' important reading of Plato, I make the case for the re-conceptualization of Plato as a 
non-doctrinal philosopher, by means of phenomenological-existential readings of his dialogues related to contemporary 
Continental thought. The essay builds upon Jaspers' largely overlooked phenomenological-existential readings of both 
Plato and Socrates in relation to Platonic scholarship emerging from the contemporary phenomenological tradition. I 
focus on a speculative interpretation of Jaspers' non-doctrinal Plato by analyzing four components of his prescient reading, 
which is an invaluable historical and philosophical document of Platonic scholarship that precedes contemporary 
Continental phenomenological approaches to Platonic interpretation by a span of more than three decades. The 
unacknowledged presence of Jaspers' phenomenological understanding of Plato reverberates in the contemporary 
phenomenological and hermeneutic scholarship focused on understanding Plato's non-doctrinal philosophical project. 
Ultimately, I read Jaspers' unique analysis of Plato in its relation to the contemporary non-doctrinal Platonic scholarship 
that is focused on questioning traditional analytic and doctrinal readings of Plato in order to learn how Jaspers' work 
might contribute to future phenomenological analyses of Plato while upholding Jaspers' deserved recognition as a 
philosophical pioneer in the field of phenomenological Plato scholarship.
Keywords: Jaspers' Plato; hermeneutics; phenomenology; Platonic dialogues; non-doctrinal Platonic readings; 
philosophieren; fundamental knowledge; dialectic-as-dialogue.
"anti-idealist" approach.3 It will be beneficial to mention 
two sources that might be said to represent early 
manifestations of this developing trend in contemporary 
Gonzalez, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers 1995, pp. 1-25, here p. 2. [Henceforth 
cited as SHP] Gonzalez presents here a brief, concise 
chronology of Platonic study that includes ancient 
philosophers, analytic and hermeneutic interpreters, 
and contemporary scholars seeking to challenge 
traditions in doctrinal interpretations of Plato.
3 Sean Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in 
Plato's Early Dialogues, Albany, NY: SUNY Press 2010, 
p. xxii. [Henceforth cited as OSQ]
It is difficult to date with accuracy the precise historical 
emergence of what is referenced and gathered under 
the general moniker "non-doctrinal" interpretations of 
Plato and Socrates in contemporary scholarship, which 
has been expressed in terms of, to provide but three 
prominent examples, the "anti-mouthpiece" Platonic 
reading,1 the "third way" of reading Plato,2 and the 
1 J. Angelo Corlett, Interpreting Plato's Dialogues, Las 
Vegas, NV: Parmenides Publishing 2005, p. 45.
2 Francisco Gonzalez, "A Short History of Platonic 
Interpretation and the 'Third Way'," in The Third 
Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies, ed. Francisco 
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converge:
First, knowledge of the virtues in the dialectic is 
viewed as non-propositional in nature, as a form of 
philosophical understanding which is displayed—or 
better, instantiated—in praxis; second, philosophical 
understanding of the virtues cannot be taught through 
transmission, as from teacher to pupil (student) or from 
speaker to listener; third, unlike the scientific method, 
the dialectic-as-dialogue does not terminate in a final 
and definitive result, it does not yield a final product 
(ergon), neither is it transposable nor disposable; fourth, 
the relation to truth that the dialectic establishes is always 
limited because of the existential distance separating 
a human being from full revelation of the Being of 
virtue, due to the existential constraints of human 
finitude; fifth, there is a positive and experienceable 
philosophical element or content that, although eluding 
expression in propositional terms, is nevertheless 
present within the dialogues and must be drawn out 
through interpretive efforts attuned to the relationship 
between the dramatic form of the dialogue and its 
philosophical content; and sixth, to systematize Plato 
as a philosopher who embraces systematic doctrines is 
to disingenuously reduce the complex depth and vast 
scope of his philosophy.7
Although it is not vocalized in contemporary 
non-doctrinal readings of Plato that emerge from the 
Continental phenomenological tradition, nonetheless all 
six of these tenets are being expressed and developed in 
unique ways within Jaspers' readings of both Plato and 
Socrates.8 My primary focus here is to elucidate Jaspers' 
7 See James M. Magrini, Plato's Socrates: Philosophy and 
Education, Cham, Switzerland: Springer Press, 2018.
8 Joanne Waugh, "Jaspers on Plato," in: Karl Jaspers: On 
Philosophy of History and History of Philosophy, eds. 
Joseph W. Koterski and Raymond J. Langley, Amherst, 
NY: Humanity Books, pp. 69-81, here p. 69 [henceforth 
cited as JOP]. My claim is that Jaspers' reading of 
Plato has been neglected in the Continental tradition 
focused on phenomenological-existential readings of 
Plato's dialogues. Waugh makes the more dramatic 
and sweeping claim that the many unique aspects of 
Jaspers' interpretation of Plato from "his study of the 
great philosophers," which Waugh believes crucial 
to an understanding of Plato, receive "insufficient 
recognition in most recent English-language Platonic 
scholarship" (JOP 69). It must be noted that as related 
to my current concerns, Waugh made this observation 
in 2003. Her essay focuses on reading Plato through 
the lens of philosophy as philosophieren. For Jaspers, 
Platonic scholarship, which challenge and break away 
from the familiar traditional analytic approach to 
reading Plato in terms of a doctrinal and systematic 
philosopher. First, I bring attention to the 1988 anthology 
of alternative essays on Plato and the dialogues edited 
by Charles Griswold Jr.4 and second, I acknowledge the 
collected writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer focused 
exclusively on philosophical-hermeneutic readings 
of Plato's dialogues.5 For it is interesting to note that 
Gadamer writes on such issues as the hermeneutics 
of facticity, finitude, and the nothingness at the heart 
of the human condition, language, and all interpretive 
activities; themes that contribute in part to inspiring 
contemporary phenomenological readings of Plato in 
the Continental tradition.
Besides OSQ, the other contemporary Continental 
study that is referenced throughout, which represents 
influential phenomenological studies of Plato's 
dialogues—both works make no mention of Jaspers, 
however—is Drew Hyland's Finitude and Transcendence 
in the Platonic Dialogues.6 Already the reader should get 
a feeling for the diversity of such Platonic scholarship 
as introduced, because "non-doctrinal" readings 
cannot be tightly organized into an academic "school" 
of interpretive thought, that is to say, "non-doctrinal" 
readings do not adhere to strict and unwavering 
tenets of interpretation, nor do they adopt a common, 
singular, or agreed upon methodology. Although 
there is nothing resembling a codified, unified, or 
systematized "non-doctrinal" conceptual or interpretive 
framework to be applied across the field of scholarship, 
they do demonstrate what might be called "family 
resemblances." It is possible to understand some of 
the shared concerns of this diverse group of scholars, 
and this includes the more recent trend in this type of 
evolving interpretive work, namely, phenomenological 
readings of Plato and the dialogues, by attending to 
the following common thematic issues where various 
strands of scholarly interpretation might be said to 
4 Charles Griswold, Jr. ed., Platonic Writings/Platonic 
Readings, New York, NY: Routledge, 1988. [Henceforth 
cited as PWR]
5 For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and 
Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutic Studies on Plato, transl. P. 
Christopher Smith, New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1980.
6 Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic 
Dialogues, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995. [Henceforth 
cited as FTP]
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unique non-doctrinal phenomenological reading 
of Plato that precedes contemporary Continental 
phenomenological approaches to Platonic interpretation 
by a span of more than three decades.9 The essay is 
divided into four sections: (1) Jaspers' conception of 
philosophy as philosophieren from which inspiration is 
drawn for re-conceptualizing Plato, (2) Jaspers' essential 
claims used for grounding his non-dogmatic reading of 
Plato, (3) Jaspers' view of fundamental knowledge that 
is reminiscent of Platonic philosophy and the virtues, 
and (4) the emergence of fundamental knowledge 
through the unfolding of the dialectic-as-dialogue and 
its potential implication for human transcendence as a 
turning of the soul (periagoge) back to itself in a moment 
of philosophical-ethical enlightenment.
Jaspers' Conception of Philosophy as 
Philosophieren:  
Inspiration for Re-Conceptualizing Plato
My analysis of Jaspers' phenomenological Plato is not 
read through the conceptual lens of Jaspers' philosophy 
of Existenz. Albeit, my speculative reading does embrace 
key components of his philosophy as they are related to 
philosophieren indicates that philosophy is a dynamic 
process, which in an ever-renewed fashion works 
toward deepening our understanding in communion 
with others. As related to Jaspers' Platonic 
interpretation, philosophieren denotes a life of inquiry 
attuned by the knowledge that philosophy is open-
ended and, because of its unique mode of inquiry, can 
never provide definitive answers or solutions to the 
questions it poses or the problems it confronts. Waugh 
has contributed several studies of Plato that approach 
the philosopher from a non-doctrinal perspective. 
Her contributions are focused on the impossibility 
of separating so-called "Platonic" philosophy (as a 
system) from the context of the dialogues. I thank the 
anonymous reviewer of this essay for bringing my 
attention to this important commentary on Jaspers. I 
also thank the editor for offering valuable suggestions 
that contributed to greatly improving this essay.
9 Filiz Peach, "Phenomenology, History and Historicity 
in Karl Jaspers' Philosophy," in Analecta Husserliana 
LXXXX (2006), 45-64. Peach describes Jaspers' 
relationship to phenomenology as being different from 
both Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger: "The 
place of Jaspers' phenomenology in his philosophy 
is a complex issue. Although he uses the method of 
phenomenology he does not consider himself as a 
phenomenologist" (p. 45).
understanding Plato as a "non-doctrinal" thinker. The 
anti-idealist non-doctrinal reading of Plato, takes aim 
at the problem of a two-world metaphysics that has its 
ground in a quasi-Cartesian philosophical view that 
is anachronistically projected back onto Plato. Jaspers' 
Existenz philosophy holds a view about "traditional" 
metaphysics that is relatable, not to Descartes, but to 
Kant. For Peach, Jaspers' conception of 
transcending-thinking (transzendierenden Denken)...
mirrors the Kantian concept of reality and the self in 
the sense that transcending is grounded in the world of 
human experience, 
and this indicates that Jaspers embraces a metaphysics 
that appears to retain the dualist "distinction between 
appearance (phenomenon) and the thing-in-itself 
(noumenon)."10 Jaspers' view might also be said to harbor 
the ontological difference—the difference between 
the ontic and ontological. To embrace the ontological 
difference, when challenged, in a way that is similar to 
criticisms leveled against Martin Heidegger's use of this 
distinction in Being and Time, as we find it in Theodor 
Adorno, which gives the distinct impression of a 
hypostatized concept of Being related to an object or 
entity.11 The critique of the hypostatization of Being (The 
Fallacy of Hypostatization) as it might be understood in 
doctrinal readings of Plato's philosophy, manifests itself 
in the belief that the Forms (eidoi) can somehow become 
proper objects of a form of knowledge that is sure and 
certain. And, if it is possible to produce a definitive 
account of the Forms in toto, then this would indeed 
speak of a legitimate doctrine of forms in Platonic 
philosophy, the very notion that is challenged within 
Jaspers' non-doctrinal scholarship.
To further explore this issue, when the hypostatized 
notion of Being is understood in terms of objective reality, 
it can only be grasped through objective knowledge. 
This understanding in Platonic scholarship, as Waugh 
points out, restricts philosophical knowledge to 
prevailing knowledge and, in highly reductive terms, 
links the entirety of "Platonic thinking with prevailing 
knowledge" (JOP 73). This view radically closes off a 
phenomenological understanding of Plato, for the initial 
10 Filiz Peach, Death, "Deathlessness" and Existenz in Karl 
Jaspers' Philosophy, Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University 
Press 2008, pp. 45-6. [Henceforth cited as DDE]
11 Theodor Adorno, Jargon of Authenticity, transl. 
Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will, Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973.
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that are crucial for Jaspers as well as for Plato are wonder 
and skepticism: Wonder inspires questioning, while 
"man's doubt in the knowledge he has attained gives 
rise to critical examination" (WTW 17). In its essence, 
philosophieren searches for an authentic awareness of 
the human condition, for an understanding of oneself, 
others, and the world, and this occurs when we are 
confronted by and respond to ultimate situations 
(Grenzsituationen), the so-called existential "situations 
which we cannot evade or change" (WTW 20), but when 
responding to them, human lives hold the potential to 
become meaningful in a variety of ways. As authentic 
philosophers, we can never "forget that we must die, 
forget our guilt, and forget that we are at the mercy 
of chance" (WTW 20). Indeed, Plato's dialogues are 
dramatic literary records of the philosopher's response 
to ultimate situations in his efforts to understand 
them. Philosophy is not about formulating theories or 
devising calculative plans to confront such existential 
situations, for true philosophy does not reside above the 
human condition in a free-floating theoretical manner, 
nor does it work out technical-empirical machinations 
in response to the ultimate problems of life. Rather, in 
an engaged mode of Being-in-the-world, as a necessary 
life activity, task, and vocation, its essence is revealed 
within our actual experience of living it and doing it, 
and this is why philosophy for Jaspers, much like Plato, 
is a process of "learning how to live" (WTW 125), which 
is to say, learning how to question our living ideas in 
such a way that within our discourse, aimed at the 
revelation and communication of those ideas, thought 
and praxis are inseparable.
The focus on discourse, as related to Plato and 
the practice of the dialectic, bespeaks the ultimate 
source of philosophy for Jaspers, namely, the "will to 
authentic communication" (WTW 26), which embraces 
and attunes us to all the other sources. Philosophy 
occurs only in dialogue and through open-ended 
communication where dogmatism and closed-
mindedness are eschewed, and only in sustained and 
ever-renewed conversation is the manifestation of truth 
possible. Truth, in terms of fundamental knowledge, 
does not occur because of the process, rather it 
happens as a possibility only within the process, for 
the presence of the Being, "resides only in unreserved 
communication between men who live together and vie 
with one another in a free community," which indicates 
that the practice of philosophy, as a life-project or task, 
is a "loving contest in which each man surrenders his 
weapons to the other" (WTW 26). Doing philosophy, 
appearing of the virtues to Socrates and his interlocutors 
are labeled spurious, and worse, discounted as mere 
appearances, when virtues manifest as opinions and 
beliefs (as the doxastic requirement of the dialectic, as 
for example in, "tell me what you believe about virtue 
x") that are crucial for getting the dialectic started. 
As Sean Kirkland points out, such appearances are 
separated from the objective realm of true Being since 
the "‘independence' of the object from our initial human 
reception of it will almost certainly be taken to entail a 
separation of being from appearing" (OSQ 18). Just from 
these brief remarks, it is clear that by attempting to read 
Plato directly through the conceptual lens of Existenz 
philosophy one risks the potential dangers associated 
with reconfirming the traditional metaphysical aspects 
of Plato's philosophy that contemporary non-doctrinal 
Platonic scholarship seeks to challenge and put into 
question. However, recognizing this potential problem 
as outlined, there is a way to accept along with Jaspers 
that there are existential-transcendent aspects of human 
existence that can nevertheless be experienced in a 
legitimate manner without falling victim to the critique 
of a two-world metaphysics, despite their ineffable 
nature of always exceeding the human's limited form 
of understanding. When talking of Being in relation to 
Jaspers' reading of Plato, the existential can be conceived 
as inseparable from its manifestations which indicates, 
when this perspective is linked to a phenomenological 
understanding of Plato, that the initial appearance of 
the virtue that is questioned and clarified in the context 
of the dialectic is inseparable from the Being of virtue, 
as its presence manifests in obscure ways in daily life 
with varying degrees of intensity.
The understanding of Jaspers' conception of 
philosophy and its task are crucial in approaching a 
non-doctrinal re-conceptualization of Plato. Authentic 
philosophy for Jaspers is philosophieren, which indicates 
that philosophy is an activity rather than a coherent set 
of organized doctrines or dogma, for it resists the drive 
to produce a "body of didactic principles purporting to 
be definitive and complete."12 Jaspers emphasizes the 
"on-the-wayness" of philosophy in its ever-renewed 
dynamic unfolding, through which the deepest 
existential possibilities for a human's Being-in-the-
world might be revealed. Two sources of philosophy 
12 Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom: An Introduction to 
Philosophy, transl. Ralph Manheim, New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press 1954, p. 12. [Henceforth cited as 
WTW]
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as Jaspers understands it, as a communal practice, 
holds the potential to inspire a sense of self-awakening 
through self-understanding. Philosophieren recognizes 
that authentic thinking occurs within a context that 
seeks to establish a relationship with Being or what 
might be termed the primal mystery within all things, 
which at once envelops all things, and which is present 
in ways that are obscured and oblique, in ways that 
call for philosophy to attempt to elucidate it, to wrest 
it from concealment, all the while working to preserve 
and shelter that which must always remain "present as 
mystery" (WTW 177).
According to Jaspers, the authentic philosopher's 
task is grounded in the "unconditional imperative," 
which is an imperative that "precedes every aim, it is 
that which determines all aims," and this indicates that 
the unconditional imperative is not the object of the 
will but rather "its source" (WTW 55). So monumentally 
weighty is the unconditional imperative that "it decides 
the ultimate basis of a man's life, which determines 
whether it is significant or meaningless" (WTW 57).13 
This unconditional imperative is not innate to human 
beings, and must be revealed "through lucidity that is 
the product of reflection" (WTW 56), and when it makes 
its presence known, a monumental decision must be 
made with regard to its appropriateness for a given 
task, in relation to one's inner Being, for it is identical 
with one's disposition (hexis). This relates to Jasper's 
reading of Plato, to the normative implications of the 
13 Mike H. Awalt, "Writing the Disaster: Inscriptions 
of the Self," in Death, Suffering, Identity, ed. Daniel 
Primozic, New York, NY: Rodopi Press 2002, pp. 5-19, 
here p. 9. Jaspers identifies Socrates as the "purest 
example" of a person embracing the unconditional 
imperative and living under its directives, making 
"no concession" and refusing "to avail himself of the 
opportunity for flight," thus dying "happy, staking 
everything on his faith" (WTW 53). One needs only 
to look at the Apology where Socrates describes to 
the jury his life-task and vocation in the service 
of the Delphic god. One can also find in Plato this 
dedication to the unconditional imperative, for Awalt 
makes the compelling case that Plato's entire life was 
dedicated to "living the disaster," that is to say, doing 
philosophy and writing as a rejoinder to the situation 
within which he found himself in and against which 
he struggled. It is possible to state that for Plato the 
ultimate or unconditional imperative was living the 
death of Socrates, for the "reality of Socrates' death 
won't go away and must be written again and again" 
(p. 9).
unconditional imperative, for the ultimate imperative 
instantiates an awareness of self in terms of "what I ought 
to be" (WTW 55), what I ought to do and, moreover, 
what we ought to do. As opposed to remaining 
immutable once it is discovered, the potential exists 
through the philosophical life that the unconditional 
imperative "can be transformed in rebirth" (WTW 56). 
Indeed, the unconditional imperative is born, has its 
origins, to return to the nature of true philosophy, out 
of the desire to transcend one's present conditions, in 
fleeting moments of partial enlightenment, and to 
struggle in an attempt to change what we are in the 
isolated and individuated moment of the present, with 
an eye to both the future and beyond, what might 
potentially be eternal and infinite. Since no discursive 
logical arguments can be offered in defense of the 
unconditional imperative, no categorical reasons exist 
to demonstrate the necessity that we dedicate ourselves 
to heeding its call and address, to place ourselves under 
its charge and law, Jaspers claims that this requires from 
the authentic philosopher—much like Socrates and 
Plato—to follow "it in faith and awareness" (WTW 57).
The Platonic Standard, The Dogmatic Tendency: 
Jaspers' Non-Doctrinal Approach to Plato
Both non-phenomenological and phenomenological 
approaches to non-doctrinal Platonic interpretations 
are traceable to the dichotomy initially emerging from 
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers) in 
terms of the false dichotomy between skeptical and 
doctrinal readings of Plato. Francisco Gonzalez informs 
us, Diogenes "tells us that an interpretation of a Platonic 
dialogue must decide, among other things, whether 
statements in it are meant to establish Plato's own 
doctrines...or to refute the interlocutor" (SHP 5). The 
skeptical reading is confined to the opinions of Socrates 
and the interlocutors, and the reader should not take 
these opinions as comprising any type of systematic 
philosophical doctrine. This type of reading, which 
is eristic in nature, yields no positive philosophical 
content. The doctrinal reading, on the other hand, does 
extract a definitive and positive message or content 
from Plato's dialogues, but this so-called content is 
possible only because Plato's philosophy is understood 
as systematic or doctrinal in nature. Jaspers' disagrees 
with both of these approaches to Plato, stating, with 
respect to the skeptical reading: eristic discourse 
that "serves no other purpose than to annihilate the 
enemy is a very different matter from the discourse 
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aimed at communication with a view to the truth."14 
In relation to the doctrinal view Jaspers objects to the 
interpretations by Eduard Zeller and instead cautions, 
when attempting to reduce Plato's philosophy to the 
"form of a comprehensive doctrine": we encounter a 
host of irresolvable problems, not the least of which is 
"destroying existing structures for the sake of a rational 
system that can never be anything but imaginary" (PA 
7). To elucidate a doctrinal reading of Plato, I turn briefly 
to the scholarship of William and Mabel Sahakian 
who demonstrate a paradigmatic exercise in rigidly 
systematizing every aspect of Plato's thought.15 
The authors' systematizing of Plato includes 
the strict categorization of Plato's various theories or 
doctrines of knowledge and reality expressed in terms 
of epistemological essentialism (asserting a noetic grasp 
of Plato's Forms by means of applying the dialectic) 
and in terms of metaphysical dualism (doctrine of 
the Forms or Ideas—reality versus appearance), both 
of which affect how we view humans and the world, 
and the ways of how knowledge relates to the world. 
Sean Kirkland argues that what we encounter in such 
a doctrinal reading is a quasi-Cartesian ontology or 
worldview and epistemology projected back onto 
Plato in an anachronistic manner (OSQ 11). Sahakian 
and Sahakian also identify doctrines (for example the 
Doctrine of Anamnesis) along with identifying an 
essentialist theory of ethics and values, even in the 
various myths in order to buttress their claims for a 
doctrinal Plato. This poses a multitude of problems for 
interpreters, given the ambiguity involved in Plato's 
practice of incorporating myths together with reasoned 
argumentation (logos). In such doctrinal interpretations 
of Plato, the dialectic is embraced as a sure and certain 
truth-divining method, which when applied with 
philosophical acumen, ascertains and procures truth 
that is beyond skepticism. The dialectic allows Socrates 
to glean truth of the Forms (eidoi) and ultimately the 
Idea of the Good (agathon) with categorical certainty, in 
terms that are allegedly consistent with and expressible 
through propositions.16 When embracing a doctrinal 
14 Karl Jaspers, Plato and Augustine, transl. Ralph 
Manheim, ed. Hannah Arendt, New York, NY: 
Harvest, 1962 pp. 24-5. [Henceforth cited as PA]
15 William Sahakian and Mable Sahakian, Plato, Boston, 
MA: Twain Publishing, 1977. [Henceforth cited as P]
16 See Francisco Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue in Plato: 
Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry, Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press 1998, pp. 209-45. 
view of Plato's philosophy, one must, out of necessity, 
either ignore or attempt to explain, in relation to a 
unified and completed system or one in development, 
the various dialogues of Plato that are aporetic in 
nature and end in bewilderment, where the quest 
for a trustworthy definition of the virtue in question 
eludes Socrates and his interlocutors as we find in the 
Republic Book I, Charmides, Laches, Meno, and Theaetetus.17 
Contributing to this line of reasoning, Waugh argues, 
when making the error of reducing philosophical truth 
to prevailing knowledge, or the knowledge of objects, 
we perpetuate "a view of language and philosophy in 
which the fact that Plato wrote dialogues is irrelevant 
to his philosophy and to knowledge" (JOP 77). For 
Waugh, Platonism instantiates a "series of philosophical 
commitments" (JOP 75) to such an understanding of 
philosophy, that manifests in a systematic pursuit of 
propositional or formable knowledge.
For Jaspers, there is an authentic Platonic standard 
[Henceforth cited as DDP] In relation to the doctrinal 
idea of propositional knowledge of the virtues, 
Gonzalez also talks of a form of knowing that is 
linked with the philosopher-rulers understanding 
and practice of the dialectic in the Republic. When 
the dialectician moves from the hypothetical 
method of dianoia to glean truth in a moment of 
noetic insight—when graduating beyond discursive 
modes of inquiry—the first principles and so-
called objects of intelligible thought are known with 
axiomatic certainty, that is, with the unwavering and 
unquestioned veracity of mathematical principles.
17 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. To use the 
term "doctrinal" as related to Platonic studies includes 
critical methodological approaches to interpretation 
that emerge from developmentalist and unitarian 
perspectives. The former holds that Plato's systematic 
philosophy develops and evolves over the vast 
corpus—which means that the historical-temporal 
unfolding of Plato's writings instantiate, because 
they chart, the development of the progressive and 
ever-maturing system of philosophy. The latter one 
indicates that a gradually developing philosophical 
message or system emerging from the dialogues that 
Plato's thought is unified—and hence organized and 
systematized—and that each dialogue has its own 
unique manner of presenting and revealing for the 
reader aspects or components of that holistic and 
unified view. The former type of doctrinal reading 
is famously expressed in the scholarship of Vlastos 
and the latter species of doctrinal interpretation is 
embraced by Sahakian and Sahakian.
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of philosophizing that stands beyond the dogmatic 
tendency in scholarship of systematizing Plato, and 
he is unequivocal on this matter: "There is no explicit 
system and no indication of the stages of Plato's 
development," rather the sense of wholeness that 
encompasses his thought is to be found in the act of 
philosophizing itself, which "pervades the entire work 
and defies exact formulation" (PA 7). For Jaspers, Plato's 
philosophy is a form of freedom that thinks and speaks 
from out of an originary "scene of growing awareness, 
not a communication of immutable truths," and hence 
is never reducible to a system, and what remains true 
throughout the dialogues Plato wrote, is that the "idea of 
the enduringly true" resists codification and reification 
within a set of definitive doctrines, for it "fundamentally 
and essentially evades objective knowledge, direct 
statement, or adequate formulation" (PA 49). As related 
to the views of contemporary non-doctrinal Platonic 
scholarship, Jaspers resists the interpretive
tendency toward conclusive dogma, the shift from 
fluid ideas to a congealed Idea of being, from a 
playful reading of signs to an externalized objective 
knowledge, from experimental thinking to the finished 
product of thought. [PA 57]
Although drawing a distinction between early and 
later dialogues, with the early ones drawing inspiration 
directly from "the living Socrates" (PA 14), Jaspers finds 
a consistent and unifying theme that runs throughout 
the entire corpus of Plato's writings, namely, the manner 
in which human excellence (arete), as it relates to the 
ethical life, manifests itself within the dialectic. Arete is 
not viewed as a destination toward which the dialectic 
inevitably leads, in terms of an attainable end, but rather 
as a philosophical ideal toward which those who pursue 
knowledge of arete and self-awareness are directed. It 
represents the "radiance of an excellence that shows 
itself in contest," which is in essence the knowledge 
that is revealed in the "actuality of thinking action," the 
knowledge, or better, the fundamental knowledge, that 
is one with the primal mystery and a human being's 
character or disposition (hexis), of those "who act well," 
relates at once to the soul and what ought to be done as 
an imperative of the good life (PA 14). It is this pursuit 
of the ideal and perfected notion of arete that drives the 
Platonic philosophical project, which thinks through 
the inspiration it receives from this perfected vision of 
arete, revealed in and through the fleeting light of Being, 
while understanding that arete can never be brought to 
full disclosure because its Being in its essence remains 
concealed, it recedes from full disclosure, and this is 
why in philosophy's pursuit of arete, "its positions are 
always changing" and the "ultimate answer is never 
given" (PA 16).18  With this understanding of the open-
endedness of philosophical discourse, it is evident that 
the good life is never at an end, always in the process of 
being restructured and reinterpreted through ceaseless 
questioning, and this, in one form or another, is what is 
present to all the dialogues according to Jaspers: "What 
is already present in the early dialogues runs through 
the whole of Plato's philosophizing, whose power of 
growth seems to know no limits" (PA 16).19 Indeed, what 
18 Gregory Fried, "Back to the Cave: A Platonic Rejoinder 
to Heideggerian Postmodernism," in Heidegger and the 
Greeks: Interpretive Essays, eds. Drew Hyland and John 
Manoussakis, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, pp. 157-76. [Henceforth cited as BTC] Within 
Gregory Fried's phenomenological reading of Plato's 
Socrates, the crucial distinction is made between 
what Fried terms zetetic philosophy (to seek) and 
echonic philosophy (to have), which consitutes the 
marked difference between Socratic skepticism and 
the idealized philosophy of the philosopher-rulers of 
the Republic. Similar to Jaspers, Fried makes the case 
for echonic or idealized imagery inspiring, keeping 
alive, and driving on the zetetic and skeptical quest for 
truth in Plato's philosophy. Here again, we find such 
a notion expressed by Jaspers incorporating different 
terms when he analyzes the so-called "Doctrine of the 
Immortal Soul," informing the reader that Socrates, 
from whom Plato drew profound influence, viewed 
the idea of an immortal soul as an ideal from which 
to draw inspiration for philosophizing and living. 
The immortal soul is not based on rational proof, but 
rather its acceptance represents the "'venture' of living 
in hopes of immortality," worthy of our devotion for 
"peace of mind demands such ideas," but Socrates 
always guarded "against any certainty that might be 
regarded as a possession conferred by knowledge." See 
Karl Jaspers, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, transl. 
Ralph Manheim, ed. Hannah Arendt, New York, NY: 
Harvest Books 1962, p. 14. [Henceforth cited as SBCJ]
19 Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic 
Dialogues, Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1995, p. 9. It is 
this line of interpretive thought that moves away 
from the strict division of the dialogues as found in 
developmentalist readings, that is expressed in similar if 
not identical terms by Hyland in his phenomenological 
reading of Plato. Hyland claims that in every dialogue 
the recognizable and indelible phenomenological 
themes of finitude (limitation) and transcendence are 
present and this contributes to the development of 
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Jaspers observes about Socrates, who "was filled with 
an awareness of his vocation" (SBCJ 7), might equally 
be true of Plato, who lived in the "lucidity of his reason, 
out of the Comprehensive of nonknowledge" and 
ultimately dedicated his life through obedience to an 
absolute imperative" in a way that won him "authentic 
being as the foundation of his decisions" (WTW 53).
I briefly turn to Jaspers' unique non-doctrinal view 
of the Forms (eidoi) or as he prefers, Ideas, in order to 
demonstrate its stark contrast to the doctrinal reading. 
The rigid two-world Platonic metaphysics upon which 
the doctrinal reading depends, is ineluctably linked with 
an ethics grounded in knowledge, exclusively related to 
the realm of the intelligible Being (on) as opposed to the 
realm of the perceptual or sensual Becoming (me on). 
Here, the Ideas serve an ontological and transcendental 
model or paradigm of reality that the terrestrial realm 
instantiates or imitates. This indicates in a disingenuous 
manner that in order to demonstrate arete and moral 
excellence, knowledge of the Form or essence (Being) 
of virtue must be acquired and possessed by the 
philosopher in terms of certainty. In his non-doctrinal 
reading, Jaspers observes that notions of Ideas manifest 
in various ways throughout many of the dialogues, 
"some of which run through the whole work from the 
earliest dialogues, while others make their appearance 
later" (PA 31).20 In one way or another, the Ideas play a 
role in directing the philosopher's thought toward the 
perfected and idealized realm of true Being (the realm 
of the Ideas), 
but their expression changes according to the manner 
in which the search is communicated. When they 
become fixated in a doctrine [it] creates insoluble 
problems. [PA 31]
a deeper sense of understanding human excellence. 
This opens the potential for an interpretation that in its 
own unique way allows each dialogue to express these 
themes while avoiding the rigid systematizing common 
to the both the developmentalist and unitarian views.
20 Jaspers rightly points out, by turning to the Greeks, 
that Plato employs a host of varying terms when 
referencing the Ideas, contributing to their general 
ambiguous nature or natures in relation to his 
philosophy, for instance, "form (eidos), shape (morphe), 
type (genos), essence (ousia), unity (monas, henas)." 
Plato often is unclear as to what is included in the 
"world of Ideas, of whether everything which in any 
way is also has its Idea" (PA 30), such as living things 
like human beings or horses and manufactured items 
or artifacts such as tables or beds.
Hyland points out that for Plato's unending pursuit 
of the ethical life and the virtues, as it is concerned with 
the realm of the normative, the Ideas can be imagined 
as "principles of intelligibility" (FTP 165-95), in terms of 
inspirational visions or idealized vistas into the Being 
of virtue, which propel forward the philosopher's 
pursuit of arete. There is one consistent notion that can 
be drawn from Jaspers complex interpretation of the 
Ideas without lessening their import within Platonic 
philosophy, namely, Plato's philosophy instantiates 
the drive to conceptualize a thing's unity, clearly a 
response to the Pre-Socratic problem of the one and 
the many, that underlies the Ideas, for instance, "the 
individual horse perishes but the concept of the horse 
endures" (PA 31) and, as importantly related to ethical 
concerns, despite the various manifestations of virtue in 
particular situations, there is an Idea of virtue that gives 
unity, as a principle of intelligibility, to the manifold 
ways that virtue comes to presence. Since we do not 
have a proper logos available to bring the Ideas to stand 
in thought and language with categorical veracity, 
Jaspers claims we should turn to the metaphorical and 
even poetic language Plato incorporates, which is best 
suited for attempting to describe the Ideas, for it offers 
an intimation of and pathway into something that can 
perhaps inspire and point us in the direction of such 
Ideas as a perfected form of reality and potentially 
keep our "gaze fixed in that direction" (PA 30). Since the 
existential-transcendent realm defies communication 
via traditional modes of communication and its being 
beyond reasoned argumentation and syllogistic 
logic, the Ideas are "adumbrated in metaphors and 
concepts" (PA 29), and here it is possible to add to 
metaphors and concepts, myths and the hypothetical 
thought experiments of Socrates.21 Although such 
communication might confuse, or appears to be arcane, 
"it is just this absence of finite clarity that gives us an 
intimation of something that cannot be communicated 
in any other way" (PA 30).
Fundamental Knowledge: Knowledge that is 
One with the Reality of the Knower
In their doctrinal reading of Plato's Republic, Sahakian 
and Sahakian claim that once dialectic argumentation 
21 Jean-Francois Mattei, "The Theater of Myth in Plato," 
in Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings, ed. Charles 
Griswold, Jr., New York, NY: Routledge 1988, pp. 66-
83, here p. 67.
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passes beyond the mode of discursive reasoning and 
the hypothetical method, the illustration of truths 
through images is no longer required; in this approach, 
a diagram or allegory "ascertains the truth as it really 
is" (P 122). The movement through the Divided Line, a 
graded hierarchy of forms of knowledge, levels of their 
reliability, and realms of their respective intelligibility 
(intellectual/perceptual), is the educative "passage from 
the natural world of sense to the ultimately real world 
of thought, that is, from appearance to reality," whereby 
the knowledge of the "Good is attained through 
dialectic intuition" (P 122). There are metaphysical, 
epistemological, educational, and ethical issues bound 
up with the doctrinal reading of the dialectic, which are 
problematic and traceable to the understanding of the 
dialectic as a truth-divining (noetic) method that destroys 
the philosopher's use of and dependence on hypotheses 
(dianoia) and puts the dialectician in direct intellectual 
contact with the Idea of the Good. The authors state 
explicitly that when the mind makes "direct contact 
with the Platonic ideals and the Good," reaching a state 
of knowledge that is "absolutely true and enduring" (P 
148), the hypotheses are disposable because they are 
"no longer required in perfect intellection or dialectic 
knowledge" (P 151). The foregoing interpretation is 
problematic for those espousing the doctrinal position, 
for it ignores that Plato's Socrates has little if anything 
to say about exactly how this form of instruction in the 
dialectic actually transpires or about how the desired 
results are supposedly achieved, and in the Republic, 
from whence this doctrinal reading originates, Plato's 
Socrates actually denies that such epistemological 
results are even possible.
In this view, as against that of Jaspers' interpretation 
of Plato's practice of philosophy, the understanding of 
both the dialectic and its effectiveness along with the 
type of knowledge or truth that might be associated 
with the virtues in Platonic philosophy is questionable. 
Stated succinctly, a doctrinal reading wrongly 
categorizes the dialectic as a disposable method that is 
applicable within and transferable to many situations. 
It is also problematic to claim that the dialectic is a 
successful method for acquiring and hence possessing 
intellectual insight (noesis) or certainty about the truth 
of the First Principles, which enables philosopher 
rulers to deduce from these principles the eidoi of the 
individual virtues that Socrates talks of, such as justice, 
courage, piety, sophrosune, and wisdom. This gives the 
disingenuous impression that the dialectic produces 
a product (ergon) that stands outside the (poietic) 
process of its unfolding through the elenctic dynamic of 
question-response-refutation. A doctrinal reading also 
endorses an erroneous interpretation of Plato, ascribing 
to the philosopher the belief that knowledge of virtue is 
like a techne, or form of technical knowledge, and hence 
can be acquired and possessed and then passed along 
through transmission. This is not the case, for this is 
neither a view of philosophy, nor of dialectic, nor does it 
pursue a form of knowledge that either Jaspers or Plato 
endorses. Jaspers makes this clear for his readers when 
he articulates that fundamental knowledge associated 
with the virtues in Plato, "cannot be taught in the same 
way as the knowledge that is a means to an end" (OSQ 
34).22 Jaspers contends that fundamental knowledge is 
inseparable from the type of dialectic-thinking that Plato 
advocates and describes in the dialogues. Jaspers links 
fundamental knowledge to the revelation of Being or, 
what might be understood in relation to Jaspers' Plato, 
the primordial mystery that is inherent in all things. 
Such existential insight into the Being of arete does not 
possess a definitive instrumental value and, as stated, is 
never reducible to "formable knowledge" or to "dogmas 
and articles of faith" (WTW 12).
Several characteristics of the fundamental 
knowledge of virtue can be drawn out from Jaspers' 
analysis: Fundamental knowledge is irreducible to 
propositional discourse, in that we cannot capture and 
hence possess the reality or the very Being of the virtues 
in an objective manner, stating definitively, "Justice is x" 
"Courage is y," or "Sophrosune is z," which is to say, the 
original Socratic question, ti esti; this indicates "What is 
it?" in transliterated Greek, finds no definitive response, 
arrives at no complete state of closure, refuses to 
terminate in propositions, because it is always on-the-
way. Fundamental knowledge is non-propositional in 
nature and might be said to be manifest and revelatory 
as opposed to describable or explainable, as there is no 
object that can be explicated with the sense of clarity 
and certainty associated with propositions—techne and 
episteme—for that which "by its very nature is essential 
refuses to be fixated in doctrine, for in such fixation it 
would be lost" (PA 21). Fundamental knowledge might 
be said to be manifest and neither fully describable nor 
explainable because it shows itself as it is demonstrated 
22 Kirkland's phenomenological conclusion aligns with 
that of Jaspers regarding the knowledge of the virtues, 
for human wisdom of arete is "nothing other than the 
acknowledgement of not having a techne-like grasp of 
virtue" (OSQ 77).
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in praxis as it emerges from and hence provides insight 
into our ethical disposition (hexis) to act in one way or 
another, and this occurs in the very act of questioning the 
virtues and, ultimately, in the authentic life dedicated 
to the philosophical pursuit of arete. Jaspers talks of 
fundamental knowledge illuminating the way of Plato's 
philosophical thinking, in that it arises or manifests as 
we traverse the path directed toward understanding the 
ethical life, while it simultaneously illumes or lights the 
entire philosophical journey (DDP 1-20).23 Indeed, the 
essence of Platonic thinking in relation to fundamental 
knowledge is an "orderly speaking in questions and 
answers in the hope of finding a path upon which the 
final illumination provides guidance without becoming 
an object" (PA 17).
Indeed, this is the reason why Plato in Letter 
VII goes to great lengths to explain that the so-called 
content of his philosophy, which of course in essence is 
the concern for pursuing and interrogating the virtues 
and the understanding thereof in search of the ethical 
life, defies description and explanation like other 
subjects, for fundamental knowledge of the virtues 
manifests and is revealed in a practice mirroring Jaspers' 
philosophieren when "living with the subject itself in 
frequent dialogue, as a light kindled from a leaping 
flame, comes to be in the soul [disposition] where it 
presently nourishes itself" (341 c-d).24 When pondering 
the type of thought and knowledge associated with the 
pursuit of Plato's philosophical project, Jaspers asserts 
that it is "not essentially an acquisition of something," 
but instead an originary "soaring of one's own being: 
with this knowledge man is transformed" though 
a mode of attunement (Stimmung) that instantiates 
a change to or "turning around" (periagoge) of the 
disposition (hexis), transformed as it is "guided by 
whatever is revealed in thought," and this occurrence, 
the moment when knowledge nourishes the soul, is the 
"basic trait of philosophical reflection from Plato" (PA 
23 It must be noted that in Platonic scholarship the 
recognition and analysis of non-propositional 
knowledge of the virtues in Plato's dialogues receives 
the most thorough treatment in the writings of 
Gonzalez. In light of and inspired by Gonzalez's 
dramatically original reading, I have sought to 
draw out the phenomenological elements of such 
an interpretation as they might relate to Jaspers' 
phenomenological understanding of Plato.
24 Plato, "Letters," in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1997, pp. 
1634-1676, here p. 1659.
19). The event of periagoge is a moment (Augenblick) of 
change, attunement, and enlightenment that nourishes 
the soul or disposition and strengthens the bond and 
relationship between logos and bios. Here, logos, refers 
to the ever-renewed pursuit of fundamental knowledge 
of the virtues as this pursuit instantiates and defines the 
philosophical and therapeutic project of care for the 
soul, which is the ethical life (bios) for Plato.
This indicates, in a radical manner, that in the 
pursuit of virtue, human beings instantiate virtue, for 
in the "fundamental knowledge of justice [humans] 
become just" (PA 20). Jaspers points out that in 
the presence of fundamental knowledge there is a 
relationship established between the will to do good 
and the knowledge that inspires our fundamental drive 
to act, to deliberate and choose well, in an essential 
understanding and attunement of arete. Fundamental 
knowledge of the virtues occurs only in dialogue, 
within a community. Since there is a transformation 
(periagoge) to one's Being or disposition, there is 
an undeniable connection between fundamental 
knowledge and self-knowledge or self-awareness. 
In proximity to the notion of periagoge that I develop 
here, also Waugh recognizes that in the presence of 
fundamental knowledge "one is transformed by the 
knowledge one gains; consequently it is a process which 
never reaches certainty nor a conclusion," and although 
"we do not acquire this knowledge—perhaps because 
we do not acquire this knowledge—it transforms us" 
(JOP 76-7). For fundamental knowledge "is always in 
motion" and it is a "knowing that is one with the reality 
of the knower" (PA 44-5), and hence in addition to the 
undeniable practical (phroentic) element linked with 
the unique understanding the virtues for Plato, there 
is also a unique reflexive component to fundamental 
knowledge. Jaspers stresses that knowing and being 
oneself is most authentic when what is most one's 
own is pursued, which occurs only in the drive toward 
philosophia and the potential good that comes when 
discoursing among non-competitive and like-minded 
individuals concerned with administering therapy to 
each other's soul. This notion of self-knowledge might 
be related to the living Socrates' devotion to adhering 
to the Delphic epigram, "Know thyself" (gnothi seaton), 
for Socrates within his practice of the elenchus-dialectic 
"does not hand down wisdom but makes the other 
find it," by turning toward the self, and this indicates 
that "each man must find knowledge himself; it is not 
a commodity that can be passed from hand to hand, 
but can only be awakened" (SBCJ 8) in the soul of the 
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questioner, which is inseparable from a developing 
sense of self-awareness. This self-awareness includes 
the ever-deepening understanding of the individual's 
relation to the Being of the virtues and their proper 
place in a good and just life.
What is ultimately called for, Jaspers argues, 
as drawn from his reading of Plato, is the crucial 
understanding of the relationship between fundamental 
knowledge and finite ways of knowing the world 
along with our place within the world, and here, I 
reiterate that the existential and everyday ways of 
inhabiting the world are inseparable. Finite knowledge, 
which is termed formable, objective, or propositional 
knowledge, holds "consequences in the technically 
governable world outside me and within me," however, 
it does not function in such a way as to change or attune 
my Being; "it brings about no transformation in its 
possessor," and since it does not influence the soul or 
disposition of its possessor, "it is neutral in regard to 
good and evil, it can be used and misused" (PA 20). It 
is ultimately fundamental knowledge that gives "finite 
knowledge its guidance and so dispels its neutrality" 
(PA 20). Jaspers brings the reader's attention to an 
incident recounted in the Charmides that expresses the 
idea of the crucial difference between the fundamental 
knowledge of good and evil as it differs from both 
techne and episteme as expressed by Plato through 
Socrates' dream of the perfect technological state, 
which although efficient and productive, is bereft of an 
authentic sense of morality without philosophy and the 
understanding of good and evil, without which none of 
the fine technological things will be done in an excellent 
or good way (173a-174e).25 
Fundamental Knowledge and the Unfolding of 
the Dialectic: Dialectic as the Thought-Dynamic 
of the Thinker Transforming Himself
Describing Plato's philosophical method as "dialectic-
as-dialogue," does not point out that Plato wrote 
dialogues, but rather emphasizes that Jaspers views 
the philosophical practice of interrogating as being the 
essence of human arete in terms of an extended and 
renewed conversation that unfolds through dialectic 
interchange, a back-and-forth that deals with a refutation 
(elenchus) that is directed toward a positive, albeit limited, 
25 Plato, "Charmides," in Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 
1997, pp. 639-663, here pp. 660-1.
form of philosophical enlightenment. Jaspers' view is 
related to contemporary phenomenological readings 
of Plato inasmuch as that the dialectic is radically 
unlike the scientific method and does not terminate in 
the sure and certain grasp of truth that functions as a 
product of dialectic unfolding, presumably standing 
outside the interpretive process of questioning. Jaspers 
calls the dialectic the "thought-dynamic of the thinker 
who transforms himself in rising to higher knowledge" 
(PA 35), and all insight of a higher existential order 
requires the soul's turning to an enlightened state 
(periagoge) and back to itself, which as Jaspers informs 
us is an event inseparable from authentic education 
(paideia) as it is conceived by Plato. This transformation 
that comes from the outside, it is a variant of self-
awareness, which indicates that knowledge cannot 
be poured into a human being as if one were an 
empty vessel, nor is it a change that can be expressed 
in and through the accomplishment of definitive and 
quantifiable objectives, as it would be consistent with a 
systematized or standardized education. The periagoge 
unique to the dialectic is an experience or event of 
enlightenment through the revelation of fundamental 
knowledge that inspires a change to one's Being, soul, 
or disposition (hexis). Thus, the dialectic "does not bring 
knowledge of a new object which we then apprehend, 
but aspires with the help of the idea to transform our 
conscious being" (WTW 31). This view of the experience 
of fundamental knowledge, the abrupt presence of the 
lighted flame of truth in the midst of the dialectic's 
unfolding (the Augenblick), defies dogmatic readings 
of Plato's dialectic, for it is directed, much like Plato's 
thought in its entirety, toward the "attempt to fashion an 
instrument for the communication of an independently 
achieved awareness of being—not a self-sufficient body 
of objective knowledge" (PA 42).
The dialectic embodies an "ascending movement 
and thinking in being itself," a "dynamic that directs us 
forward" as we hold ourselves within the vacillations 
of the precarious, unpredictable, and difficult unfolding 
of the interpretive "circular movement of speculation" 
(PA 35-6). Contrary to the doctrinal reading of Plato, 
where the hypothetical method culminates in the 
noetic method and the absolute grasp of indelible 
truths—propositional or axiomatic—Jaspers proposes 
a unique understanding of the dialectic that is non-
doctrinal in nature. The dialectics movement, which is 
focused on winnowing out false or questionable beliefs, 
interrogating untested opinions, and loosening the 
hold of dogmatic views, unfolds through interpretive 
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activity that refutes and is eristic in the effort to arrive at 
positions that demonstrate temporary veracity through 
reasoned communal consensus, a form of warranted 
assertions, which is always open for reinterpretation 
through new and renewed lines of questioning. It is 
possible to understand the dialectic as comprising 
three repeatable stages or moments as described 
by Jaspers: (1) We consider the presuppositions 
grounding our beliefs and claims to truth, (2) We form 
hypotheses in order to test those views regarding 
those presuppositions and claims, and (3) We work 
toward wresting from concealment the fundamental 
knowledge that provides a glimpse into the hitherto 
unseen and unknown ground or arche of those original 
presuppositions, which locates Plato's Socrates and his 
interlocutors, through the making present of the truth, 
in the existential proximity of the Being of the virtue 
that is interrogated (BTC 167-8). Jaspers expresses the 
goal of the dialectic as the attempt "to think back to the 
beginning that precedes all presuppositions" and begins 
by attending to presuppositions that are neither viewed 
nor classified as "absolutely first and highest," but rather 
draws from these presuppositions in order to form 
hypotheses that serve as the dialectician's footing, the 
"steps mounting to that which has no presupposition, 
the beginning (arche) of the whole" (PA 37). Then, as 
opposed to stopping and jettisoning the method—as 
would be consistent with a doctrinal reading of Plato—
once the dialectic reveals the partial presence of arche, 
it descends again, "retaining everything that is related 
to the beginning" (PA 37). Whatever has been revealed 
in the fleeting moment of truth, disregards everything 
false and questionable, since opinions and beliefs are 
revealed in a new and clarifying light of truth and as 
such have been winnowed out.
To further the discussion relating to the three 
moments of the dialectic, I focus on the authentic place 
or topos of a human being within this unfolding process, 
and Jaspers names this locale, this context of dwelling, 
the "between." The dialectic, according to Jaspers, 
unfolds as it is situated, and here we must include the 
human condition in its essence, in-between opposing 
and contradictory ways-of-Being, for example, Being 
and non-Being: "Contradiction becomes a spur to 
motion, the medium in which opposites occur," within 
which "a ‘driving power toward being' is experienced" 
(PA 38). Thought is always occurring and kindled by 
the encounter with oppositions and the movement 
between them that is the hallmark of Plato's dialectic 
for Jaspers. It is the task of the philosopher, according 
to Plato, to mediate the realm of opposites, and it is 
through and within the unfolding of the dialectic that 
this mediation occurs, where "separates are joined, 
whereby the one is present in the other or has a share 
in it" (PA 37). The notion of the "between" in relation to 
Plato's philosophy and Plato's Socrates as philosopher 
can be understood in the following way: A human 
being is set out, or better, stretched out, between full 
knowledge (Being) and absolute ignorance (non-
Being), and navigates this realm by mediating it, while 
participating in both extremes and finding the middle 
ground or the "between."26 As philosopher one is in 
a sense condemned to this realm, for although one 
always seeks to exist beyond the state of non-knowing, 
and hence avoids falling victim to dwelling within 
ignorance, the full disclosure of truth remains elusive, 
the full revelation of the Being of the virtues pursued 
remains shrouded in mystery, due to certain aspects of 
the idealized and perfected vision of their essence.
Indeed, as stated earlier in relation to philosophieren, 
Jaspers believes that it is essential to embrace and 
shelter this mystery, for we recognize that in "the 
clearest communication of his thoughts…the mystery 
of philosophical endeavor becomes speech while 
remaining always present as mystery" (WTW 177). It 
for this reason that Plato incorporates in addition to 
the logoi, myths and hypothetical thought exercises that 
Socrates regularly practices attempting to communicate 
through intimation and gesture what the truth of Being 
might be like. Here, it is possible to understand Jaspers' 
concept of ciphers in terms of Plato's unique and poietic 
way of gesturing towards or intimating existential 
understanding that cannot be articulated in everyday 
modes of language. "Ciphers (Chiffreschrift)," as Filiz 
Peach informs us, are "intuitive symbols," which are, 
however irreducible to symbols, this is so because 
"symbols objectify what they symbolize, where as 
ciphers do not," and so, in a sense, speak the language 
26 Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, transl. 
Michael Chase, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 2002, pp. 39-51. Hadot offers an interesting 
analysis of this realm of the "between" in Platonic 
philosophy by turning to Diotima's teaching in the 
Symposium (23c-d), where there is focus on the 
crucial difference between Socratic ignorance and 
base ignorance when compared to the all-knowing 
immortal gods. Here, too we encounter the notion 
of philosophy being stretched out between and 
mediating—much like Eros—the realm of base 
ignorance and divine omniscience.
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of the mystery (DDE 41). Ciphers, we might say, serve 
as the authentic language of the between, which a 
true philosopher seeks to inhabit when pursuing 
the ethical life, and by working tirelessly through the 
ever-renewing stages of the dialectic, by repeatedly 
interpreting and re-interpreting one's findings, with 
the purpose of clarifying the knowledge that has been 
temporarily brought to stand through the dialogic and 
interrogative processes.
Since Jaspers refers to the dialectic as the thought 
dynamic within which the thinker transforms himself, 
it is necessary to attempt to elucidate the moment 
of turning (periagoge), of transformation to the soul 
(disposition), which is the event of the revelation of 
fundamental knowledge in the midst of the dialectic's 
unfolding, facilitating the moment of enlightenment. 
In straightforward terms, Jaspers refers to this as an 
event of learning, and it is the case that in the moments 
of truth's flashing forth, those who participate in the 
dialectic actually do learn, their understanding of the 
subject of their interrogation is deepened, and their 
Being or disposition transforms—a turning of the 
soul back toward itself and enlightened (periagoge)—
in the presence of fundamental knowledge of the 
virtues, they become virtuous. Reading the moment 
of truth's revelation in terms of the Augenblick in a 
phenomenological way, is consistent with what Peach 
terms the "existential interpretation" of the Augenblick 
(DDE 124-8).27 On this understanding, the Augenblick 
might be said to represent the moment of revelation 
where there is an experience of a "subjective existential 
moment in objective time," an existential experience 
"when one's awareness of Being is most acute" (DDE 
27 The basic distinction Peach makes between mystical 
and existential readings of the Augenblick centers on 
the notion of eternity in Jaspers' philosophy as related 
to death, deathlessness, Existenz, and Transcendence. 
In the "mystical reading," Being is eternal, and "since 
there is no dichotomy in Being," it is possible, upon 
death, to speak about one's Existenz as "the individual 
consciousness is absorbed in this ultimate reality 
and returns to its original source which is infinite 
and eternal," as becoming both eternal and timeless 
and "thereby deathless." Since Jaspers does not 
endorse the individual persisting after death, the 
"mystical interpretation does not represent Jaspers' 
metaphysical thinking in this respect," and so Peach 
argues that interpreters should turn to the "existential 
reading" of the Augenblick in relation to death and 
deathlessness (DDE 123-7).
127), when the individual moves into existential 
proximity to Being, "‘touching' the transcendent 
realm as it were" (DDE 128). This is precisely what 
Jaspers claims about the illumination of fundamental 
knowledge in the dialectic, which occurs at a "point 
where suddenly, in a single moment, the good itself, 
true being, that which surpasses comprehension and 
can never be captured, is present to the insight" (PA 
43). This indicates that in the Augenblick the Being of 
the virtue reveals itself, a moment of unconcealment 
occurs, and through a momentary crack, or renting 
of the veil of everyday experience, the light of 
fundamental knowledge shines through—nourishing 
the soul. And because participation in this event is 
transformative, as an event of periagoge, it is ecstatic, 
in that the participants are attuned and transported, 
they momentarily transcend or stand outside objective 
modes of cognizing and relating to their experience of 
the world and others.28 In this way, as Peach observes, 
a human being "has an awareness of the transcendental 
dimension in human existence," and it is a moment 
within which it is possible to experience an awakening 
to one's authentic selfhood (DDE 132). At the moment 
of the Augenblick, when participants in the dialectic 
are transported into the presence of the Being of the 
virtues, they move into closer existential proximity to 
a perfected form of knowledge, while at once attuned 
to the understanding that the distance between limited 
human wisdom and a perfected idealized omniscience 
can never be fully traversed and closed, for Being 
always recedes from full-concealment, forever retains 
its essence as mystery.
Jaspers contends: "If good and the Ideas cannot 
be taught directly, they can be fostered in dialectical 
thinking" (PA 42). To conclude this section and to 
28 In line with our non-doctrinal Plato, challenging 
the traditional view espousing a two-world 
metaphysics and the absolute divide between 
reality and appearance, this moment of existential 
insight does not transport the individual beyond 
the everyday world—it is not an otherworldly 
(supra-sensuous) experience—rather, because the 
two realms are inseparable, it opens our everyday 
ways of understanding the world to the momentary 
experience of the existential-transcendent aspects of 
our Being-in-the-world. So, the Augenblick is an event 
that ultimately enhances and enriches our everyday 
experiences, in the precise way Jaspers claims that 
the revelation of fundamental knowledge enhances 
all modes of formable knowing.
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reiterate a crucial point unique to Jaspers' early non-
doctrinal interpretation of Plato, the insight into what 
I have referred to as the Being of virtue occurring in the 
dialectic happens only in and through the interpretive 
activity itself—and never as a product (ergon) that 
stands outside and apart from the process—for 
as stated, within the presence of the fundamental 
knowledge of justice, we become just, and the same 
might be said of wisdom, piety, sophrosune, and 
courage. So, in essence virtue is instantiated through 
the dialectic activity itself as one is enlightened in the 
encounter with fundamental knowledge of the virtue 
as it is being interrogated. This calls for Socrates and 
his interlocutors to hold themselves in the unfolding 
dialectic-as-dialogue despite the difficulties 
encountered. Where other interpreters, such as 
Francisco Gonzalez and Sean Kirkland, have rightly 
stressed the difficulty, danger, and pain of such an 
endeavor, Jaspers stresses several unique and crucial 
qualities of the soul or disposition necessary in order to 
inspire and push the dialectic forward—in a protreptic 
manner—that are worth mentioning: The ability to 
listen and good manners, which includes releasing 
ourselves over to the other in order to allow the other 
to be seen the best possible light. What I recognize as 
the humane component of dialectic communication 
is expressed by Waugh in the following terms: 
"Communication or dialogue [always] takes place 
between what is other-than-objects" (JOP 76). When 
an individual is open to listening to another one, he 
is at once "open to persuasion" and refuses to believe 
that he is "in the ultimate possession of truth" (PA 24). 
To embrace epistemic limitations with a healthy dose 
of skepticism includes the attunement to an authentic 
sense of Socratic ignorance, being aware that we do 
not know, and beyond, demonstrating an eagerness 
to further develop our understanding of things, for 
Plato recognizes that "Socrates always sought to 
provoke the knowledge of non-knowledge" (PA 27). 
For all dogmatic and purely polemical attitudes are the 
enemies of true dialectic-as-dialogue, which lives and 
thrives only within a context framed by candor and the 
"attitude of benevolence toward the other" in the effort 
to improve in a therapeutic manner the other's soul, 
and this is why as the "art of purification," the dialectic 
"opens the way to knowledge by showing men what 
they do not know," for those who believe they know 
"refuse to learn" (PA 25), refuse to enter into the dialectic 
in search of fundamental knowledge.
Concluding Thoughts
Jaspers' analyses of Plato and Socrates, despite 
their brevity, add valuable philosophical insights 
to Platonic studies. For example, Jaspers' use of 
ciphers and their relationship to myths and thought 
experiments that Socrates carried out; and in general, 
the manner in which ciphers relate to Plato's literary 
choice of writing dialogues as opposed to formal 
treaties, a theme that is prevalent in Waugh's studies 
of Plato.29 I have briefly touched upon how Jaspers' 
work relates in a phenomenological manner to the 
evolving scholarship in Continental thought in order 
to bring attention to the uniqueness and prescient 
nature of Jaspers' pioneering work on Plato. Jaspers' 
contributions to the phenomenological tradition 
deserve to be acknowledged and critically reviewed 
so that they further inspire the re-thinking, or re-
conceptualization, of Plato's philosophy in order to 
accord an explicit presence to Jaspers in future readings 
that seek to transcend analytic and doctrinal norms 
in the interpretation of Plato's work. It is noteworthy 
that Heidegger also provides phenomenological 
interpretations of both Plato and, in a far more limited 
way, Socrates. Currently, scholars disagree as to 
whether Heidegger's Plato is doctrinal or not, I claim 
that his reading of the so-called historical and proto-
phenomenological Socrates (but not Heidegger's 
Plato) is decidedly reminiscent of the portrait of 
Jaspers' non-doctrinal Plato.30 My speculative reading 
29 For example, Joanne Waugh, "Socrates and the 
Character of Platonic Dialogue," in Who Speaks for 
Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity, ed. Gerald A. 
Press, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
pp. 39-53.
30 James M. Magrini, Re-Conceptualizing Plato's Socrates 
at the Limits of Education: A Socratic Curriculum 
Grounded in Finite Human Transcendence, New York, 
NY: Routledge 2017, pp. 49-59. In line with Francisco 
Gonzalez, I also interpret Heidegger as embracing and 
espousing a decidedly doctrinal reading of Plato. This 
Heideggerian vision of Plato in relation to the first 
beginning of philosophy is perhaps most (in)famously 
articulated and expressed in a detailed manner by 
Heidegger in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth." Indeed, 
as related to what was stated above, in What Calls 
for Thinking? Heidegger's interpretation of Socrates 
bears a striking resemblance to Heidegger himself; 
a pure ontological thinker who stands at a radical 
remove from any form of philosophy that might be 
systematized. However, the question of whether or 
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of Jaspers embraces a phenomenological approach 
that additionally demonstrates, as in Waugh's 
understanding, a "hermeneutical conception of 
philosophy," which she argues, applies, or is at least 
related, to Jaspers himself (JOP 72). This essay does not 
attempt to serve as an exposition or exegesis proper 
not Heidegger's so-called doctrinal reading of Plato 
is comparable to the doctrinal and systematic view of 
Plato commonly found in the interpretations of the 
analytic tradition, is something of an ongoing point 
of contention in Heidegger scholarship. For example, 
see Robert Bernasconi, The Question of Language in 
Heidegger's History of Being, Amherst, NY: Humanity 
Books, 1985.
of Jaspers' thoughts, however, I believe that Jaspers 
would view this precise type of speculative reading as 
continuing the tradition of thinking-and-writing that 
can be experienced in Plato's philosophy when he is 
perceived as a non-doctrinal thinker. For according to 
Jaspers, speaking to my point, Plato "attached great 
importance to dialectic speculation but recognized its 
failure when it strove to become conclusive and ultimate 
knowledge" (PA 51-2).
